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ABSTRACT
Flood control has long been a major problem for 
Phoenix, Tucson, Albuquerque and other southwestern boom 
towns, and Las Vegas was no exception. From its birth 
in 1905 until the mid 1970s, the "Civil Law Doctrine" 
was the legal concept used by courts and residents to 
settle disputes over drainage problems. Civil Law 
dictated that land owners had to accept "hostile 
upstream surface drainage" onto their property but could 
discharge it onto the downstream property owner's land 
with no legal liability. This viewpoint coincided with 
the frontier notion of individualism so popular in 
Nevada and West. Moreover, it also dovetailed with the 
hallowed tradition of the less government intervention 
in local affairs the better. So, the Civil Law Doctrine 
and the frontier mentality along with a low tax base and 
a general distaste for government spending all conspired 
to delay the establishment of a meaningful flood control 
infrastructure in the Las Vegas Valley until the late 
1980s.
Aside from the damages caused by the city's rapid 
expansion over washes and flood plains in the 1960s and 
1970s, the real breakthrough for flood control came in 
1976 when Alfred Powers and others successfully 
challenged the Civil Law Doctrine in District Court in a
iii
suite against Clark County. This suit had far reaching 
implications for the metropolitan area, because it 
overturned the Civil Law Doctrine that had been the law 
for 75 years in Nevada and for over 100 years in 
California. The court accepted another concept known as 
the Reasonable Use Rule, which stipulated that each case 
be judged on its own merits and that local governmental 
approving agencies could be held liable for urban 
development that caused increases in the ratio of 
rainfall to runoff. This change in legal thinking 
altered the structure of urban development and local 
governmental ideology concerning flood control in Las 
Vegas as well as the Western United States.
This paper will argue that the court's decision to 
change the guiding legal principle from the Civil Law 
Doctrine to the Reasonable Use Rule in Nevada ended the 
frontier viewpoint of individualism and replaced it with 
a new spirit of communal action. The legal revolution, 
along with a series of events tied to the valley's 
mushrooming urbanization energized the long dormant Las 
Vegas Valley Flood Control District which quickly won 
support in 1986 for implementing the flood control 
agenda. While emphasizing the legal dimension the paper 
will place the court ruling within the context of the 
city's urban sprawl and the growing political sentiment 
favoring flood control.
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INTRODUCTION
Speculation about flood control, or lack of it in 
Las Vegas, has been a compelling community issue since 
the founding of the city in 1905. Early concern 
developed over the problem with the arrival of the first 
European-American settlers, and continues to be debated 
today. The passage of time, dimming of memories, 
frontier parsimony, and lack of official records have 
all contributed to the community's failure to develop a 
comprehensive flood control history of the Las Vegas 
Valley. With factual data obscured, non-existent, 
fragmented, or distorted, local leaders have relied on 
newspaper accounts of past floods to guide them in the 
decision making process. Reports such as an article 
that appeared in the Las Vegas Review Journal on 11 
August 1991, proclaiming that "Flood projects chase 
decades of neglect"1, often captured the attention of 
the reading public, but rarely resulted in remedial 
action to ameliorate the situation.
Accusing public officials of neglect has become the 
standard journalistic theme postulated by the press 
since the founding of the community. Solutions to the 
flood control problem, however, have not, and cannot, be 
found in newspaper headlines. Those answers remain
1
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hidden in the geological, intellectual, cultural, 
political, and economic past of the community.
Las Vegas is situated in an artesian basin 
completely surrounded by mountains. Differences in 
altitude within the area range from a high of 11,900 
feet above mean sea level at Charleston peak in the 
Spring Mountains to 1,200 feet on Lake Mead at Hoover 
Dam. The city's average elevation is approximately 
2,000 feet above sea level. Even though the Las Vegas 
basin drains an area of 1590 square miles, the Las Vegas 
Wash is the only outlet for storm water generated on the 
watersheds. All of the surface water, from morning dew 
to the severest rain storms must pass through it 
en-route to the discharge point at the Colorado River.2
The mountains surrounding Las Vegas are composed of 
igneous rock interspersed with large deposits of exposed 
sedimentary rock, including limestone, dolomite, shale, 
and slate. Layers of weathered multi-hued sandstone, 
wrenched to the surface by eons of sub-surface folding 
and faulting, indicate erosion from both wind and water. 
Silt washed into the valley from eroded rock and 
sandstone forms an alluvial fan in the lower part of the 
basin. Thick deposits of sandy loam on the valley floor 
sustains a growth of green vegetation that boldly 
contrasts against the inhospitable barrenness of the 
surrounding desert.
Silt built up over eons had gone relatively unused 
by early indigenous tribes of hunters and gatherers
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wandering across the valley floor prior to the arrival 
of the first generation of European-American settlers 
with their fences, orchards, and plowed fields. Early 
nomadic Paiute Indian tribes used the springs and shade 
trees along Las Vegas Wash as temporary resting places 
during their pilgrimages across southern Nevada's arid 
desert. Migratory Indians, unlike the newly arriving 
European-American pioneers, enjoyed a special 
relationship with nature that placed different values on 
both land ownership and use.
The Indians lived with nature, harvesting fish, 
game, roots, and herbs as they ripened, or came into 
season much as a farmer harvests his crops of alfalfa 
and grain. Moreover, they exercised a communal 
stewardship over the land that sanctioned tribal 
territorial rights rather than personal control. On the 
other hand, European-Americans believed in private 
ownership of land, fences, roads, buildings, livestock, 
and agricultural equipment for the operation of their 
farms and ranches. Furthermore, the freedom of movement 
enjoyed and practiced by nomadic aborigines in the 
region emphasized their notion of communal land 
ownership, and their ability to change home sites to 
avoid natural disasters. When faced with challenges 
such as floods, Indians followed their instincts by 
moving to the safety of high ground. Whereas, European 
settlers, bound by their system of private ownership, 
remained at home to rebuild their damaged property.
4
Supported by a strong frontier mentality of self- 
reliance and independence, early European-Americans 
settled into their new homes in the Las Vegas Basin, and 
adjusted to periodic flooding that occasionally plagued 
the valley. Like the Indians before them, the settlers 
considered storms as an inconvenience brought about by 
nature. Consequently, during the first part of the 
twentieth century, townspeople in the Las Vegas Valley 
acquired cheap land in other locations after a severe 
flood, or lacking money for the acquisition of a new 
safer location, cleaned up the debris and continued with 
their lives. Coping with flooding and the elements 
became a personal challenge between the settlers, and 
nature. The triad of a small population, dry desert 
weather, and an unfavorable "cost benefit ratio"3 
contributed to the failure of pioneers to construct 
flood control projects during the towns embryoic period.
Flood protection for the fledgling whistle stop on 
the San Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad became 
an individual effort left to the discretion of the new 
property owners, who had purchased building lots in the 
townsite. Early flood control measures to protect the 
town and its people came from a reaction to periodic 
downpours rather than from careful planning, designing, 
and engineering against future destructive storms. 
Without a positive, well engineered flood control system 
the pioneers defied nature and accepted the harsh 
environment as a normal condition of frontier life.
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On 11 August 1991, the Review Journal quoted a 
present-day official of Clark County as saying that 
"initial flood control was approached with a wild west 
philosophy, where government oversight of developers was 
limited."4 The argument that Las Vegans did nothing to 
remedy the hazards of flooding was true, however it only 
illustrated one facet of the problem. Another issue 
besides the wild west philosophy, centered on the lack 
of ability or desire by local and Federal governmental 
agencies to provide tax revenues for the construction of 
flood works. Furthermore, the influx of migrants to the 
area shortly after the founding of Las Vegas also 
hindered and delayed local efforts to address meaningful 
development. Seeking bargains in cheap land for 
homesteads, newly arriving residents often purchased 
property in gullies and natural washes for home sites, 
blocked streambeds, and diverted flood water from 
drainage swales to previously safe ground. Taken 
together, all of the unsupervised land development by 
local people did more to retard the adoption of 
protective flood control measures than any other single 
event in the community's development.
Without funding for construction of flood works, 
and using every means at their disposal, early residents 
coped with the forces of nature and built a city in the 
desert. While it cannot be denied that massive 
protective flood control works could have been more 
cheaply constructed eighty five years ago, the city with
6
a population of 5,000 or less during the early part of 
the twentieth century, could not have supported such a 
costly and ambitious project. Furthermore, in the 
earliest years of the town's existence, floods did not 
threaten the community's safety.
Flood control has long been a major problem for 
Phoenix, Tucson, Albuquerque and other southwestern boom 
towns, and Las Vegas was no exception. From its birth 
in 1905 until the mid 1970s, the "Civil Law Doctrine" 
was the legal concept used by courts and residents to 
settle disputes over drainage problems. Civil Law 
required land owners to accept hostile upstream surface 
drainage onto their property but could discharge it onto 
the downstream property owner's land with no legal 
liability. This viewpoint coincided with the frontier 
notion of individualism so popular in Nevada and the 
West. It also dovetailed with the hallowed tradition of 
the less government intervention in local affairs the 
better. So, the Civil Law Doctrine and the frontier 
mentality along with a low tax base and a general 
distaste for government spending all conspired to delay 
the establishment of a meaningful flood control 
infrastructure in the Las Vegas Valley until the late 
1980s.
Aside from the damages caused by the city's rapid 
expansion over washes and flood plains in the 1960s and 
1970s, the real breakthrough for flood control came in 
1976 when Alfred Powers and others successfully
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challenged the Civil Law Doctrine in District Court in a 
suite against Clark County. This suit had far reaching 
implications for the metropolitan area, because it 
overturned the Civil Law Doctrine that had been the law 
for 75 years in Nevada and for over 100 years in 
California. The court accepted another concept known as 
the Reasonable Use Rule, which stipulated that each case 
be judged on its own merits and that local governmental 
approving agencies could be held liable for urban 
development that increased the ratio of rainfall to 
runoff. This change in legal thinking altered the 
structure of urban development and local governmental 
ideology concerning flood control in Las Vegas as well 
as the western United States.
The focus of this paper is the development of flood 
control in the Las Vegas Valley between 1905 and 1976. 
Central to the thesis is the argument that legal, 
intellectual, political, and economic forces 
unintentionally conspired to diminish the community's 
will for the planning and construction of flood control 
projects. At the present time, it is not enough for Las 
Vegans to dismiss the past with a few sentences about 
the failure or perceived inaction of the city's founders 
concerning the problem. Instead, we must understand the 
forces that acted upon the intellectual, political, and 
economic environment of the community in order to 
establish a more accurate history of flood control in 
the Las Vegas Valley.
CHAPTER I 
FLOOD CONTROL IN LAS VEGAS 
1905 TO 1955
By April 1905, over fifteen hundred people had 
erected temporary homes and shelters in the McWilliams 
Townsite, and along the Las Vegas Creek.1 Like the 
early Mormon settlers, who settled the oasis in 1855, 
new inhabitants to Las Vegas sought relief from the 
searing desert sun beneath the shade of cottonwood trees 
along the stream bed. The creek starts its journey to 
the sea in the hills west of Las Vegas, and meanders 
southeasterly for approximately 45 miles before 
discharging into the lower reaches of the Las Vegas 
Wash.
Without an abundance of fresh water from the 
springs and creek, Las Vegas could not have developed as 
a community, nor survived as a city. Pioneers in the 
valley avoided building in, or obstructing existing 
washes that served as natural conduits for drainage from 
watershed areas surrounding the basin. Instead, they 
sought high mesas of loamy silt on the alluvial fan that 
provided safety from flooding. Recognizing that nature 
had established drainage swales and gullies in crucial
8
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locations to carry runoff from homes, farms, and ranches 
to the lower Las Vegas Wash, farmers periodically 
cleared debris and trash from them allowing surface 
drainage to flow in an unimpeded manner to its 
destination. Intelligent use of existing un-disturbed 
terrain enabled farmers to produce abundant harvests of 
fruit, hay, grain, and vegetables to feed the expanding 
local population.
During the first decades of settlement in the Las 
Vegas Basin, the need for artificial drainage channels 
as protection from flooding was not necessary. Even 
though the organizers of Clark's Las Vegas Townsite in 
1905 had engineered, surveyed, and laid the townsite out 
into lots, blocks, streets, and school sites, they 
neither planned, nor provide for, surface drainage. The 
east-west streets, following the natural drainage 
pattern, provided the only method for nuisance or storm 
water to leave the townsite.
Four major factors influenced the community's 
failure to enact a positive flood control system in the 
valley during first half of the twentieth century. The 
first was the disturbance to the natural drainage 
pattern caused by construction of the San Pedro, Los 
Angeles and Salt Lake railroad. A second disruption 
came in the 1920s and 193 0s with the construction of the 
Salt Lake Highway, which paralleled the railroad's route 
and adopted the same drainage procedures. The third 
factor was the opening of the Boulder Highway in 1931
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between Boulder City and Las Vegas an artery that cut 
across all of the natural washes that flowed from west 
to east between both entities impeding the free flow of 
storm water into the lower Las Vegas Wash.2 Finally, 
the fourth and most serious impediment to the 
advancement of flood control policy evolved from the 
provincial frontier mentality of both settlers and local 
officials who opposed excessive governmental spending.
The railroad built Las Vegas and, at the same time 
helped create the flooding problem. In 1904, railroad 
construction crews pushed their steel rails southward 
into the valley establishing a division point, round 
house, and maintenance facility. Water played a leading 
role in site selection for the route as well as the new 
townsite. Cognizant of the water requirements of steam 
powered locomotives when pulling long trains across the 
hot dry desert, railroad engineers sought locations for 
division towns along the proposed route that provided 
water, food, and home sites for their employees.
Following standard engineering and construction 
practice in use at the turn of the twentieth century, 
the railroad installed a system of culverts in the 
larger washes supplemented with wing ditches that 
diverted storm water from smaller gullies into the major 
channels. However, lack of foresight by railroad 
engineers to perceive future urban development precluded 
the acquisition of easements and rights-of-ways for run 
off channels in washes and gullies that had been deemed
11
by the railroad to be waste land, with little or no 
value.3
Clark's Townsite and railroad shops, located on the 
alluvial fan between the two major drainage channels 
rarely experienced major destruction from floods, unless 
a rain storm swept directly over the town. Likewise, 
although flash flooding did not constitute a problem 
during the early years of the city, it became a primary 
source of concern in later years because of inadequate 
building regulation and a rapid rise in the community's 
population.4 By 1920, population growth coupled with 
inexpensive land induced many newly arriving settlers to 
build homes and businesses in marginal areas that had 
previously been considered unsafe because of flood 
hazards.
The earliest townsmen coped with periodic storms, 
and property damage on an individual basis, because they 
had no other recourse. A small tax base, lack of 
governmental funding, and failure to develop a 
comprehensive plan for flood control projects forced the 
settlers to rely upon individual solutions for their 
preservation. Furthermore, local leaders within the 
community usually followed the less politically popular 
expedient of keeping taxes low rather than proposing 
flood control works. In times of crisis, Las Vegans 
responded favorably to the challenges of nature and the 
appeals from their political leaders with enterprise, 
individualism, and self-assurance.
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From the city's inception in 1905 hostile flood 
waters prompted problems between adjacent land owners, 
city owned streets, rights-of-ways and other properties. 
By necessity residents had to establish a flood control 
strategy that excluded the expenditure of large amounts 
of capital. Confined between the parameters of 
self-help and a parsimonious government, local planning 
officials had little latitude for innovation. 
Consequently, community leaders developed inexpensive 
solutions that relied upon legal remedies coupled with 
individualism.
Rainstorms usually generated little or no property 
damage to Las Vegas before the 1920s. Newspaper 
accounts of flooding indicate that during the early part 
of the twentieth century, Las Vegans became hostage to 
floods that occurred in other parts of southern Nevada, 
rather than local rainstorms. Frequent destruction of 
the railroad line caused by natural disasters meant a 
suspension of trade and commerce between the outside 
world and the community. Above all else, people living 
in the isolated Southern Nevada oasis recognized that 
their lives and fortunes depended upon the success and 
well being of the railroad.
Today, we can only imagine the emotions of local 
residents concerning stability of life on the frontier 
as they picked up the Las Vegas Age on 9 March 1907 and 
scanned the headlines that boldly proclaimed: "60 miles 
of track destroyed and no trains to Salt Lake for 30
13
days, Las Vegas Marooned".5 The thirty day interruption 
of rail service, stopped trade, food supplies, mail, and 
commerce from the northern and eastern parts of the 
United States. It demoralized the townspeople, and 
reduced the city to an isolated outpost in the desert. 
Unhappily for the community, the railroad provided the 
only rapid means of passage across the arid desert of 
the Great Basin, and diminution of the service 
constituted a serious setback for the fledgling town.
During floods and other natural disasters the
average Las Vegan tightened his belt and accepted such
calamities as acts of "God" to be dealt with by the
railroad company or local political leaders. On 9 March
1907, the editor of the Las Vegas Age voiced the
prevalent sentiment of the townspeople that it must be
.  ' ' 'plain to railroad management that passengers and freight
would avoid the Salt Lake rail line in storm seasons
rather than take the risk of being wrecked in Meadow
Valley Canyon. In short, the editor attempted to raise
the public consciousness by asking the question: "How
many more lives must be sacrificed before removal of the
Salt Lake track from the river bed to a safe position
above high water is completed?"6
More than anything else, the shortsighted argument
by the press that flooding was the railroad's concern,
and not society's problem, added to the community's
failure to develop a regional blue print for flood
control. Here again, we can see a single minded theme
14
calling for reliance upon individualism rather than 
marshalling the community's collective social conscience 
for the development of a realistic flood control system.
Although Las Vegans knew that flooding posed a 
threat to life and property, danger from storms usually 
concerned the railroad at a considerable distance from 
Las Vegas. Significantly, the notion that "it can't 
happen here" reinforced reluctance to pursue a 
comprehensive flood control plan. Moreover, newspaper 
accounts of early floods in southern Nevada focused 
primarily on the railroads and farm communities of the 
Meadow and Muddy River Valleys. This emphasis supported 
the atavistic notion of false security.
The fragility of Las Vegas's life line to the 
outside world continued to be expressed in the headlines 
of the daily papers. On 24 March 1906, the Las Vegas 
Age reported that washouts had occurred in the Cajon 
Pass in southern California forcing the Salt Lake 
Limited (a passenger train) to be re-routed through San 
Francisco.7 Additionally, the storm caused a 
devastating washout north of Moapa requiring 350 workers 
to be moved from Las Vegas to the flooded area to 
facilitate repairs. Railroad officials estimated that 
it would take at least ten days to repair the tracks and 
possibly result in twenty to thirty days of interrupted 
train service. The City of Las Vegas received only 
minor wind damage, but once again became isolated from 
the outside world.8
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During the first week of January 1910, a massive 
storm struck Southern Nevada. Although it did not flood 
Las Vegas the local press described it as the most 
destructive storm in recent years. The deluge washed 
out one hundred miles of railroad track in Meadow Valley 
Wash, no trains ran between Las Vegas and Salt Lake City 
for nearly six months. Raging through the Muddy Valley, 
the storm destroyed crops, live stock, and fences 
leaving only devastation in its wake. One farmer lost 
60 hogs while the Moapa Improvement Company at Logan, 
Nevada lost sixty acres of grain and fifty acres of 
asparagus due to silting.9
According to the earliest newspaper accounts of 
damage caused by rain storms following heavy rains, Las 
Vegas appeared to have been spared large scale 
destruction. Moreover, it had managed to deal 
effectively with flooding problems without large 
man-made flood control works. In other words, storm 
damage to the local infrastructure prior to the 1920s 
was not large enough to be considered newsworthy.
More typically, storms of short duration merely 
washed out roads and caused minor damage to local homes. 
On 19 July 1919, a reporter observed that "Jupiter 
Pluvious" briefly visited Las Vegas with rain drops as 
large as satsuma plums. The storm deposited 1.10 inches 
of rainfall on the community, with no damage to homes in 
the area. Some dirt roads in the county had been 
slightly damaged, but the journalist characterized the
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storm as a "cool refreshing downpour."10
One of the most devastating storms to hit Las 
Vegas occurred on 28 July, 1923. The Las Vegas Age 
reported a torrential downpour that centered over the 
city causing severe damage to individuals as well as 
business establishments. Several buildings had been 
struck by lightning, a garage collapsed, and on 8th 
street, the wind blew a building down. Out at Ladd's 
Development, the bath house collapsed and fell into a 
swimming pool causing thousands of dollars in damages. 
The building which was heaviest hit was the Union 
Pacific Railroad shop, it suffered lightning strikes in 
several places.11
By 1923, seasonal storm patterns had been well 
established and the summer months defined and recognized 
as the rainy season. The United States Army Corps of 
Engineers reported in its flood analysis of the Las 
Vegas Wash, published in 1959, that large floods had 
occurred in Las Vegas and vicinity in July 1923, August 
1931, and June 1955. Furthermore, most floods in the 
area resulted from thunder storms during the summer 
season, when all precipitation fell as rain in the 
mountains, although some flooding had also occurred in 
February, March, October, and November. An average of 
thirteen thunderstorms per year had fallen on the Las 
Vegas area over a twenty-one year period from 1937-57. 
According to the Army engineers, the floods of June 1923 
and August 1931 surpassed that of June 1955 in
17
magnitude.12
From its inception, Las Vegas had searched for 
inexpensive methods to provide flood protection for its 
people. Like the railroad, the city relied on the use 
of natural washes and gullies for drainage while, at the 
same time, neglecting to provide rights-of-ways for 
surface water discharging from streets, roads, and 
ditches into existing washes. Extending ditches into 
the desert without clearly defined rights-of-ways left 
flood areas open to developers, who sought to maximize 
their profits by building homes, and commercial projects 
on cheap, marginal land within flood plains.
As the city began to grow and expand after its 
founding in 1905, engineers and planning officials faced 
a more complicated set of circumstances than the 
original railroad designers had dealt with upon their 
arrival in the valley. The railroad remained fixed in 
its original location with a static drainage equation.
At the same time, the city enlarged its physical 
boundaries and population, creating and intensifying the 
probability of flood hazards. Furthermore, the town had 
to protect streets and public property, as well as 
adjudicate problems arising from surface waters entering 
and leaving private property. In short, the railroad 
constituted a one-time project, whereas the city's 
continued growth magnified drainage problems by 
concentrating the flow of storm water from streets into 
washes that nature had created but had not designed to
18
carry large volumes of runoff.
Seeking the most economical method to deal with 
storms and the attendant damage, public works officials 
directed their attention to legal as well as engineering 
solutions. Lawyers and engineers concluded that the 
simplest and least expensive system entailed the 
acceptance of surface water into streets and ditches 
alongside the roads from abutting properties, than 
disposing of the storm runoff by directing it into the 
nearest natural wash through major east-west arteries.
To complement the surface water carriage system, 
officials adopted a legal system that provided standard, 
predictable methods for ameliorating friction between 
property owners forced to accept drainage water from 
abutting neighbors.
After reviewing the three basic rules governing 
flood waters, city and county commissioners selected the 
"civil law rule"13 as the legal principle that best 
suited the needs of the community. The civil law rule 
recognized that a servitude of natural drainage existed 
between adjoining lands, so that the lower owner had to 
accept surface water that drained onto his land. On the 
other hand, the upstream neighbor had no right to alter 
the natural system of drainage so as to increase the 
burden on the lower property owners.14
The doctrine had its inception in Roman law and the 
Code Napoleon and had been predicated upon the concept 
that those buying or acquiring land should be required
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to accept the burdens of natural drainage entering their 
property as well as discharging surface water into its 
natural downstream channel. The civil law doctrine had 
the advantage that property rights could be readily 
predictable.15 Among the legal options available to 
Las Vegans, the Civil Law Rule fit local needs more 
closely than other legal doctrines available to them at 
the time. The underlying concept of the Civil Law rule 
that advocated private responsibility over governmental 
action clearly favored inept community leaders, because 
it permitted them to dodge the difficult choices 
inherent in a confrontation over the issue, and instead 
allowed them to follow the easy path of political 
expediency.
In its pristine condition, soil in the Las Vegas 
Basin tends to act as a blotter during rain storms. 
Porous and granular natural ground absorbs a certain 
amount of water while trapping other surface drainage in 
depressions or low spots in the ground. Gradual 
infiltration and pooling of flowing water across the 
soil tends to retard the advance of flood water, while 
decreasing its capacity for erosion. Altering the 
infrastructure by constructing dwellings, streets, 
sidewalks, and other urban requirements increases the 
ratio of rainfall to runoff by creating an artificially 
impervious surface that fails to trap or absorb storm 
water, increases its velocity, and multiplies the 
destructive scouring ability of the runoff. Rain
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falling on roof tops, paved streets, sidewalks, and 
other covered areas drains on to neighboring down stream 
property with more potential for damage than it normally 
develops in its undisturbed condition.
The civil law rule required every citizen in the 
valley to take care of themselves, while respecting 
their neighbors' rights. It is here, that we can 
conceptualize the meshing of a frontier ideology, 
inadequate funding, and short sighted leadership. 
Additionally, these fundamental physical and ideological 
qualities continued to guide the community until 4 June 
1980 when the Nevada Supreme Court, in a landmark case, 
overturned an appeal to an unfavorable ruling in a law 
suit by the Clark County Flood Control District. In its 
decision the court replaced the seventy year old 
doctrine of civil law rule with "The third surface water 
doctrine generally known as the "rule of reasonable 
use."16
In 1923, the Las Vegas Age reported that Las Vegas 
represented a progressive rural county seat with a 
population of 3,000, and expectations of reaching 10,000 
by 1925.17 According to the reporter, the town prided 
itself in being the county seat of Clark County, Nevada, 
headquarters of the United States Reclamation Service 
for work on the Boulder Canyon Damsite, and a paradise 
for farmers. Moreover, the area contained 100,000 acres 
of fertile land in a proven artesian belt, with ideal 
conditions for growing peaches, pears, apricots, prunes,
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plums, apples, grapes, pecans, almonds, melons, cotton, 
hemp, and alfalfa, with as many as seven crops of 
alfalfa per year.18
The strength and weakness of early Las Vegans, 
resided in their provincialism, and the belief that they 
represented pioneers living on the last frontier 
carrying on the tradition of manifest destiny, and a 
living expression of Fredrick Jackson Turner's concept 
of the American frontier.19 Indeed they prided 
themselves on their uniqueness. In May 1923, the month 
before one of the largest floods of record to fall on 
the community, the Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover 
wrote a series of timely messages to the American 
people. His thesis was "American Individualism"20, and 
it received wide acclaim in the Las Vegas Age.
He wrote that "the American pioneer is the epic 
expression of that individualism, and the pioneer spirit 
is the response to the challenge of opportunity, to the 
challenge of nature, to the challenge of life, to the 
call of the frontier." Moreover, he declared that 
"American individualism had received much of its 
character from contacts with the forces of nature."21 
Here again, the significance of popular rhetoric from 
the nation's leaders, with the parsimonious dispensation 
of public works funds combined to support the local 
concept that the remedy for flood control lay in the 
realm of the private sector.
Land developers and builders relied on the theory
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of caveat emptor (buyer beware) when selling prospective 
home owners a new house that had been built in the 
middle of an existing wash. Cheap land, coupled with 
minimal building restrictions, made it easier to move to 
higher ground after a flood than to stay and rebuild in 
a proven flood hazard. County and City public works 
officials, lacking financial resources to design and 
construct adequate flood control works to safeguard the 
public, simply reviewed plans and approved building 
permit submittals. As late as 1975, Clark County,
Nevada continued to rely on the secondary solution of 
using streets to carry surface runoff during storms.
After the railroad, the second major project to 
affect the natural drainage of Las Vegas was the 
construction of the Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Salt Lake 
highway (U. S. Highway #91). Paralleling the railroad 
and conforming to the same general drainage pattern, the 
highway, built in the 1920s and 1930s reinforced the 
short-sighted concept that negated the need of 
rights-of-ways for building positive drainage structures 
in future years. The Nevada State Highway Department 
erected culverts and bridges in the same general washes 
as the railroad, but no rights-of-ways for surface run 
off had been secured to handle the water after it left 
the highway property.22
The third major displacement to the natural 
drainage system in the Las Vegas Valley resulted from 
the construction of Boulder Highway in 1931. The
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two-lane highway became the critical artery connecting 
Las Vegas to Boulder City during the construction of 
Hoover Dam. The proximity of Las Vegas to the dam site, 
and the recognition that Las Vegas was the closest rail 
head as well as the nearest metropolitan center of any 
consequence to the construction site mandated that a 
connecting highway be built between the two growing 
cities. The Nevada State Highway Department awarded 
it's first contract for construction on the roadway in 
1924. Designated as contract number 117, the new 
highway improvements followed the old Searchlight 
roadbed. The significance of the highway from a flood 
control view-point rested on the certainty that the 
location of the new arterial disturbed all of the 
natural drainage courses that flowed from west to east, 
and that discharged into the Las Vegas wash between the 
two cities.
Even into the 1920s, no major flood control 
channels had been constructed in anticipation of future 
growth in the valley. During the 1930s the highway 
provided a route for the influx of workers, their 
families and attendant supporting businesses between the 
two rapidly expanding cities. The once open desert land 
alongside the highway soon began to sprout homes, 
businesses, shanty towns, and tent cities that continued 
to grow and expand into the 1950s.
On 30 August 1927, floods deluged Las Vegas. The 
Searchlight road (later renamed the Boulder Highway)
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suffered more damage than any other area in Southern 
Nevada. According to County Road Supervisor King it was 
eighty percent washed out. King estimated that repairs 
to the road-way could go as high as several thousand 
dollars for full repairs.23 Even after flooding, as the 
city, county, and state road maintenance crews continued 
to dry out and make repairs, local officials made no 
concerted effort to organize a flood control plan for 
the area.
Undeveloped land along both sides of the Boulder 
Highway became prime areas for the development of small 
roadside businesses and campsites for new Hoover Dam 
workers arriving daily from all parts of the country. 
Many of the prospective employees looking for employment 
at the dam site depended on the automobile for 
transportation to and from the project, and slept in 
shanties, tents, and makeshift shacks along side of the 
roadway. Whitney (just north of todays Henderson) was 
one of these sites, and although closer to the Dam site 
than Las Vegas it had the misfortune of being located in 
a flood prone area (see appendix A).
Indeed in August 1942 a major flood damaged the 
area. A tent city between Whitney and Midway on Boulder 
highway was virtually destroyed after a heavy rain storm 
sent a wall of water through the camp and over the 
highway. Several of the tents had been split open by 
the force of the water, and many of the campers had to 
hang all of their water soaked belongings on mesquite
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bushes to dry.24 Here again, the old self reliant 
frontier mentality continued to work, with the campers 
in the tent city near Whitney.
The County's overworked building and safety 
officials overlooked the erection of homes on cheap land 
adjacent to washes and flood plains previously 
considered unfit for human habitation. Moreover, in 
some cases officials sympathized with the campers 
because of the hard economic conditions brought about by 
the great depression of the 193 0s, and looked the other 
way rather than evict them from their barren desert 
campsites. In any case, many of the original squatters 
improved their temporary quarters with more substantial 
buildings, replacing the earlier tents and shacks with 
permanent structures.
The public only finally began to focus its 
attention on flooding in the 1930s after newspaper 
articles described flood hazards in terms of near 
disaster. Although many areas had been flooding for 
years, no one had observed the damage at first hand, or 
more often considered cheap land on a flood plain to be 
marginal for development. It required keen eyed land 
speculators to fully evaluate the profit potential of 
the desert flood plains in southern Nevada. However, 
water soaked, mud covered, homes, when silhouette 
against a background of multicolored sandstone mountains 
made a striking contrast for the news-hungry reporters 
whose lurid descriptions of the disasters captured the
2 6
public attention.
Two factors influenced growth in southern Nevada 
during the 1930s. Both seriously impinged on flood 
plains in the area. Legalization of gambling and the 
attendant attraction of tourism can be seen as the first 
major step that led to massive growth in both the city 
and county. These changes brought tourists in growing 
numbers making the area one of the most highly developed 
and popular resort centers in the United States.25 More 
than anything else, the frontier spirit of Nevadans led 
to the acceptance of wide open legal gambling, with 
table games and card rooms as a growth industry in 
Nevada. Las Vegas proudly proclaimed itself the "Last 
Frontier".
In the 1940s, Las Vegas continued to expand 
especially to the south and east filling in gaps between 
the main streets and highways, while following water and 
sewer line locations that had been approved in a 
piecemeal fashion for construction by the city and 
county governments that worked from no adequate overall 
plan. The result was a hodge-podge of developments 
based largely on an unsystematic infrastructure. 
Primitive or non-existent building restrictions, and the 
shortage of building and on-site inspectors guaranteed a 
proliferation of sub-standard construction.
Furthermore, the lack of inspection led to inadequate 
safeguards necessary for the safe development of the 
community.
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Between 1905 and 1940, few records of rainfall and 
damages had been carefully documented. The newspapers 
contain the best source of information on storms for the 
early years of Las Vegas. Clearly, lack of data 
hampered flood control officials in later years, when 
inaction could no longer be tolerated, and it became 
imperative to act in the public interest for the 
protection of lives and property.
During World War II, the need for the establishment 
of the U.S. Army Gunnery range set the stage for the 
largest population explosion since the construction of 
Hoover Dam in the early 1930s. The United States Army, 
located its Gunnery Range along the south side of Salt 
Lake Highway, and west of Sunrise Mountain, the most 
flood proof area in the valley.
Las Vegas traditionally receives most of its flood 
water from the North and West in the opposite quadrants 
from the Sunrise Mountain area. Knowing this, the Army 
Corps of Engineers had reviewed the air base's proposed 
location in advance of its construction in 1941. Good 
engineering and site selection precluded major damage in 
later years to the airfield during storms while, at the 
same time, Las Vegas suffered millions of dollars in 
property damage and loss of life.
With the Army base slated to open in January 1942, 
wives, dependents, and camp followers flocked to the 
city in late 1941, overwhelming the housing market and 
forcing the construction of new schools, streets and an
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utility networks. Even the most naive and 
unsophisticated, government officials knew that changes 
in the existing infrastructure had to keep pace with the 
expanding population. Many of these army families would 
return after the war and settle permanently in the 
valley, adding their voices to the growing call for 
change.
CHAPTER II 
PUBLIC AWARENESS AND COMMUNITY ACTION 
1950— 1963
While the pressures to establish a major flood 
control system mounted during the New Deal and 
especially during the war years, the turning point in 
the frontier ideology for Las Vegans began in early 1949 
after a series of heavy thunder storms struck the city. 
Massive destruction caused by flooding forced municipal 
officials to reconsider their traditional attitude about 
the problem. They began searching for realistic 
alternatives to the situation. At the same time, public 
discontent compelled inert local governmental bodies to 
discontinue harboring notions of individual self-help as 
a means of combating flooding, and to begin exploring 
alternate methods for collective security. Compulsion 
from social, economic, and political forces such as the 
expanding military facility at Nellis Air Force Base, a 
heavy influx of discharged veterans and their families, 
a surge of war weary tourists, the growth of the divorce 
and gambling industries, and to some extent, the 
industrialization of the Henderson area all demanded 
relief from flooding.
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After the storm of 1 August 1949 that injured three 
people and cost tens of thousands of dollars in damages, 
concerned citizens began to guestion the city and 
county's ability to act responsibly in its search for 
alternate methods for flood protection. Impatient with 
the slow progress and vacillation of elected 
representatives, ordinary people formed ad hoc citizens 
committees to deal with the problem.
One such group started in Marrachie Flats, a small 
residential area located in North Las Vegas.1 On 4 
August 1949, a loose association of eighteen residents 
held a neighborhood meeting, and drafted a petition to 
the Clark County Commission demanding that government 
adopt a strong flood control policy. All in attendance 
signed the petition. The central argument of the 
committee focused on the proposition that positive 
action to control flooding had to be taken by elected 
county officials. In fairness, they noted that although 
Marrachie Flats had not been totally destroyed, it had 
been severely damaged, and could not withstand another 
storm.
Suggesting that the cost of any remedy would not 
exceed future losses due to property damage, the 
petitioners advocated several methods to ameliorate the 
situation. Their recommendations included construction 
of earth check dams, retention basins for storage of 
storm water, and a modern road system complete with 
culverts to channel overflow water under roads without
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destroying the road bed. Moreover, they commented on 
damage to the soil from sheet flow, and the consequences 
to Hoover Dam from silting action that had resulted from 
the storm. The committee also urged that a flood 
control district be formed to set a positive agenda of 
safeguards to control floods and minimize damages, such 
as the community had experienced during and following 
the storm of 31 July 1949.2
The residents forwarded their petition to the 
County Commission, and the ad hoc citizens committee 
planned its second session for 21 August 1949. At that 
meeting, W.A. Reynolds, chairman of the committee, 
reported that surface water washing out of flooded 
septic tanks and cesspools had infiltrated many water 
wells in the Marrachie Flats area. Committee members 
demanded that County Commissioners be advised of the 
contaminated wells as soon as possible. At the same 
time, the committee questioned the prudence of County 
Commissioners allowing Vegas Heights, Bellview Heights 
and other housing projects to alter the natural drainage 
and discharge flood water into Marrachie Flats without 
making any provision for safeguarding the interests of 
local inhabitants.3
The Civil Law Doctrine, with all of its 
ramifications and shortcomings clearly evidenced itself 
in the Marrachie Flats situation. An increase in the 
ratio of rainfall to runoff brought about by the 
construction of housing projects and urban
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infrastructure flooded and contaminated the water wells 
in an area that had previously been secure. Under the 
law, home owners had been compelled to accept the 
diversion of storm water and its subsequent 
contamination to their water wells with little or no 
legal recourse. Determined to alter this laissez-faire 
approach, the Marrachie group formulated an alternative 
for presentation to the County Commissioners for 
consideration.
The strength of the plan proposed by the Marrachie 
Committee manifested itself in a resolution addressed to 
the County Commission that suggested five fundamental 
principles. First, it recommended that a separate flood 
control district be formed with one County Commissioner 
on the board. Second, it recommended that the new 
district make provisions for financial aid from local, 
county, state, and federal agencies for money to fund 
flood control works. Third, it suggested that taxation 
should be explored as a means of financing flood control 
works. Fourth, that provisions be made for the actual 
construction of flood control works in the Las Vegas 
Valley. Fifth, that measures be undertaken for the 
continuous maintenance of flood works after they are 
constructed.4 Most of these recommendations later 
became state law, and formed the basis of flood control 
policy in southern Nevada.
It is significant to note that while the Marrachie 
group espoused the activist spirit of the frontier by
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challenging the status quo, it simultaneously embraced 
the progressive ideology that government experts and 
bureaucrats know what is in the public interest. More 
broadly, the group believed that government experts had 
at their disposal sufficient expertise acquired from 
other areas that had experienced similar problems, and 
could step in and remedy local flooding problems with a 
minimum of effort.
On 29 November 1949, Helen Scott Reed, County Clerk 
and Ex-officio Clerk of the Clark County Commission 
responded to the petition. At the request of the County 
Commission, she wrote to Doctor Reed Bailey of the 
United States Forestry Service in Ogden, Utah. In her 
letter to Doctor Bailey, the County Clerk solicited his 
aid in obtaining a flood control survey for the Las 
Vegas Valley. She noted that a survey in the Virgin 
River-Meadow Valley Wash district in Southern Nevada 
approached completion, and that this would be an 
opportune time to come into the Las Vegas area.5
In his response, Bailey stated that the small size 
of his flood control survey staff precluded any 
immediate attempt to start a Clark County survey. 
Furthermore, plans needed to be approved in advance by 
the Secretary of Agriculture and the budget bureau, 
because appropriations from Congress required approval 
for specific annual programs. In addition, he explained 
that his department had been committed to a two year 
project on the Columbia River Basin that precluded any
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possibility of starting new work in Southern Nevada. At
the same time, he advised her that the United States 
Department of Agriculture had tentatively planned a
similar basin wide survey of the Colorado River and its
tributaries, but still lacked the funding.6
Bailey's letter of response was prompt, short and 
to the point. His department had no funds for the 
project. Financing would have to be approved and 
provided in advance by the Secretary in Washington, D.C. 
and the department was already committed to other 
projects for at least the next two years. Clearly, the 
United States Forestry Department was in no position to 
help Las Vegas alleviate its flooding problem.
More floods hastened city-county efforts for a 
solution. On 8 September 1950, a cloudburst dumped 0.62
of an inch of water on the city in little more than two
hours. Fremont and Charleston Boulevards suffered the 
heaviest damage. Water swept through the Mayfair 
Addition seeping under door sills, destroying carpets, 
furniture, and lawns. The subdivision had been built 
across the natural drainage on the flood plain 
downstream from Clark's Las Vegas Townsite during the 
Second World War. Streets in Mayfair had been 
constructed in a north-south direction while the 
principal drainage carrying streets in Clark's Townsite 
ran in an east-west direction. Thus, the drainage from 
Clark's Townsite drained into the subdivision, blocking 
storm water seeking its way to the lower Las Vegas
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Wash.7 Years of suburban home construction on the flood 
plain finally had claimed a high price in water damage 
to the residents of Mayfair.
Again on 20 July 1951, Nellie Bunch, Postmaster of 
Whitney, reported that water surged over Boulder Highway 
and stood eight inches deep in some yards (see Appendix 
A).8 On 22 August 1951, another thunderstorm hit the 
city of Las Vegas shutting down telephone communications 
and causing power outages. It struck the Vegas Heights 
area so hard that some residents saw people paddling 
rubber boats through the streets.9 The pressing need 
for flood protection could no longer be ignored, and as 
a result, County Commissioners intensified their search 
for help.
On 7 September 1951, Rodney Colton Chairman of the 
Clark County Commission, wrote to Nevada Senator Pat 
McCarran asking him to lobby in behalf of federal flood 
control funding for Las Vegas. He also enclosed the 
letters that had been exchanged between Helen Scott Reed 
and Doctor Reed Bailey of the United States Forestry 
Service in 1949. Colton indicated that after 
investigating the damages from recent rain storms, and 
the community's inability to solve the problem on a 
piecemeal basis, the County Commission had decided that 
the only feasible alternative was to develop a flood 
control program. More than anything else, Colton 
believed that the county needed federal monetary and 
technical assistance. In short, Colton suggested to
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Senator McCarran that because of the immense cost 
involved in flood control construction perhaps, the 
commission would have to work with some federal 
agencies.10
After nearly a half century of benevolent neglect, 
the county finally began to act. It recognized that a 
flood control problem existed and that the local 
community could not handle it alone. Determined in 
their search for federal assistance, Commissioners 
sought help from Nevada's Congressional delegation in 
Washington, D.C.. On 13 November 1951, Nevada's 
Democratic Congressman Walter Baring responded by 
writing Lt. Colonel Wright Hiatt, Deputy Director of 
Civil Works for Flood Control, Corps of Engineers,
United States Army. In his letter he enclosed the 
previously mentioned correspondence between the county 
and Doctor Reed of the Forestry Service.
Representative Baring relayed the information that 
a meeting had been held in Las Vegas on 8 March 1950 for 
the specific purpose of discussing flood control issues 
facing that area. Officials of the Department of 
Agriculture expressed their willingness to cooperate 
with local interests, indicating that in their opinion 
flood problems affecting the city of Las Vegas and 
adjacent areas seemed similar to those previously 
encountered in cities of similar size by the Corps of 
Engineers in its flood control investigations.il
Hiatt forwarded the letter from Congressman Baring
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to the Chief of Engineers in Washington, D.C. who sent a 
favorable and speedy response. In his response to 
Baring, General Chorpening indicated that Senate Bill 
1020, authorizing a preliminary examination and survey 
for flood control and allied purposes of Las Vegas Wash 
and tributaries, had been passed by the Senate on 9 
August 1951. Furthermore, it had been favorably 
reported without amendment in the House of 
Representatives, as Report No. 1200, on 17 October 1951. 
Additionally, General Chorpening advised that the bill 
remained on the House calendar, and if passed into law, 
the investigation would be assigned to the Division 
Engineer, South Pacific Division.12
Baring relayed this information to Helen Scott 
Reed and assured her that "you may be sure that when 
this measure comes before the House for action it will 
receive my utmost support."13 The legislative package 
moved through Congress after receiving letters of 
recommendation from both Frank Pace Jr., Secretary of 
the Army and Charles F. Brannan, Secretary of the 
Department of Agriculture. Two agencies, the Corps of 
Engineers and the Department of Agriculture, assigned 
committees to provide interim guidance to Clark County 
during this period.14
On 27 May 1952, various government officials met in 
the County Extension Agent's Office. In was attendance 
was Warren Murphy-Field representative of the Secretary 
of Agriculture, for Pacific South West region, Harry
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Jamison, Water Conservation, Hugh Shamberger, Nevada 
State Engineer, Henry L. Lobstein, chief of flood 
control survey, Inter-mountain forest and range 
experiment station of the United States Forestry 
Service, and many other local participants with an 
interest in the ongoing flood control problem. Every 
agency present declared its for controlling the flood 
hazards threatening the valley, but until such time as a 
flood control district could be formed to collect and 
evaluate data accumulated by the government, no work 
could be performed.15 Clark County had to establish a 
responsible agency to handle the correspondence and to 
assume a leadership role in coordinating the various 
federal and state agencies.
The task facing community leaders focused on 
overcoming bureaucratic red tape, and moving the 
principal actors off dead center. They needed action 
not meetings; letters and inter-departmental squabbling 
over jurisdiction could not be tolerated. The citizens 
in the Las Vegas Valley with their take charge frontier 
attitude continued to agitate local public officials to 
bring the area into the mainstream of contemporary flood 
control technology.
In 1954 and 1955, flooding became even more severe 
than it had been in past years. It reached crisis 
proportions because the city continued to grow without 
necessary flood protection measures to insure the safety 
of the public. Land developers and governmental
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officials still elected to have streets designed as 
conduits for surface drainage while continuing to 
authorize subdivisions on cheap land located in or near 
washes and flood plains. On 27 June 1954, a series of 
cloudbursts struck Las Vegas causing the worst deluge in 
years.
As the result of the storm, Mayor James French of 
Henderson added his voice to the growing chorus of 
public officials demanding action instead of rhetoric 
from the County Commissioners over the lack of flood 
control. Boulder Highway had been the hardest hit area 
in Clark County. One Deputy Sheriff on duty told 
reporters that "the highway must have been built in an
old wash, because the water [ran] due east along side of
the road."16 French, told reporters that the city had 
hired everyone it could find to help salvage at least 
100 homes in the Federal Home Development on the east
side of the highway. On 3 August 1954, he wrote the
County Commission stressing the seriousness of flood 
problems in Henderson and proposed that all of the 
municipalities within the county join together in a 
joint flood control effort.17
The County Commissioners responded on 11 August 
1954, that the Board of Commissioners together with the 
flood control committees from all of the entities 
located in the valley had petitioned the assistance of 
Hugh Shamberger, Nevada's State Engineer, United States 
Senator George Malone, Senator Pat McCarran, and former
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congressman Walter Baring for assistance in the matter. 
All of the agencies petitioned for help had responded 
that they would work with the various county 
departments, and do everything in their power to support 
a program.18 Despite all of their assurances, another 
year passed before the Nevada State Legislature enacted 
laws enabling local communities to take positive 
remedial action.
Enumerated in the Nevada Revised Statutes as NRS 
542 the "Watershed Protection and Flood prevention 
District Act of 1955"19 became the first Nevada law to 
address the flood situation. It provided for the 
establishment of a watershed protection and flood 
prevention district not exceeding 750,000 acres in size. 
Although restricting the legislation to small watershed 
areas precluded its implementation as a meaningful tool 
in the struggle to control flooding, it nevertheless 
represented Nevada's first feeble attempt to address 
flood control, through legislation.
In any case, while political leaders deliberated 
over solutions to the problem, nature continued to 
inundate the city with rain storms. On 13 June 1955, a 
"tidal wave"20 of water swept across Las Vegas.
Although there were no fatalities, flooding became acute 
at both the Charleston and the Bonanza underpasses. The 
storm centered over the famed Las Vegas night club strip 
section of the county, turning it into a disaster area. 
Mud, debris, and storm water swept eastward across and
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down Highway 91, stacking flotsam over the median strip 
as far south as the Sands Hotel. Las Vegas's sewage 
treatment plant became dysfunctional under tons of silt 
and mud, spewing millions of gallons of untreated raw 
sewage into the lower Vegas wash. Streets under 18 
inches of flood water became impassable to motor 
vehicles and, train traffic crawled to a stop. Every 
auxiliary policeman and off-duty officer responded to 
the emergency providing 24 hour service to cope with the 
situation.21
John Cahlan, reported that "at least two feet of
water ran along West Charleston all the way to the Hyde
Park section. Many residents out my way were virtually 
isolated as water backed into yards and homes from a
depth of eight to 18 inches."22 On 13 June 1955,
Senator Alan Bible discussed the matter with Las Vegas, 
City Manager A.H. Kennedy, demanding immediate action. 
The Senator requested that a team of Army Engineers be 
contacted to make a study of the flood control options 
open to the community at that time.23
The gravity of the situation, and the severity of 
the damage prompted Bible to return to Washington, D.C. 
and confer with Major General A.D. Sturgis, Chief of the 
Corps of Engineers in Washington, D.C.. Above all else, 
the Army pledged complete assistance to the Senator and 
to the people of Southern Nevada.24 Filing an immediate 
request for federal assistance with the United States 
government under "Public Law 875, for emergency disaster
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relief, the city urged Governor Charles Russell in 
Carson City to add his voice to the appeal. Damage 
estimates climbed to $3 million, before the Corps of 
Engineers team finally arrived late in the summer of 
1955 to make their assessment.25
Regarded as the worst storm that Las Vegas had 
experienced in thirty years, it compelled the city 
fathers to redouble their efforts to find solutions.
They found that the rapid increase in population coupled 
with home building on small lots side by side with 
insufficient drainage provisions precluded storm water 
from finding a safe path through the city without 
flooding. Lands that had been previously considered 
flood prone or marginal in the early days of Las Vegas's 
growth now appealed to developers as prime building 
sites for leapfrog development.
Many home owners seeking help and unable to find it 
from local governmental agencies, sought out their 
insurance agents. According to the Review Journal, 
agents and adjusters in Las Vegas spent more time 
informing policy holders that their home owners' 
insurance did not cover flood damage than in selling new 
policies.26 One insurance agent observed that the dry 
desert location together with the high cost of premiums 
had deterred most residents from purchasing flood 
insurance. He concluded that few people living in arid 
regions cared to pay approximately 250 dollars for a 
flood insurance policy.27
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With their hopes for insurance coverage dashed, 
troubled home owners turned to other sources for 
assistance. Some help came from an unexpected source, 
George Gibson, Agent-in-charge of the Las Vegas branch 
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, reported that under 
certain conditions flood losses could be claimed as a 
deductible item under the category of casualty.28
Impatient with waiting for vague or non-existent 
federal plans to prevent flooding, county and city 
leaders finally took action. Mayor C.D. Baker, and his 
Las Vegas city staff moved on two fronts to ease the 
hazards. First, in cooperation with the Army Engineers 
on the scene, the city prepared a plan to intercept 
slope borne torrents and channel them into the desert 
areas north and south of the populated areas. Second, 
city planners and engineers wrote stiff new subdivision 
regulations that required complete design data be 
approved by the city before construction of a project or 
a home began.29
These stop gap and short term measures supplemented 
long range plans being developed by more visionary 
elements within the community. The public had been 
alerted by the press that the Corps of Engineers survey 
requested by Senator Bible had nothing to do with the 
immediate problem of repairing damage to the city, but 
instead represented the start of a long range program to 
design flood control works. On another front, the 
Review Journal reinforced the gravity of the situation
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by announcing that Governor Charles Russell had asked 
Eisenhower to declare Las Vegas a disaster area, and had 
requested $600,000 from Federal Emergency Funds.3 0
On 21 June 1955, President Eisenhower, officially 
declared Las Vegas a major disaster area and ordered 
that $200,000 in federal funds be made available to the 
city for repairs.31 North Las Vegas, in the spirit of 
the frontier tradition, declined federal assistance 
deciding instead to clean up the destruction with local 
labor. North Las Vegas Councilman Earl Evans stated 
that "he did not believe the total amount of damage was 
enough to seek federal relief funds, pointing out that 
if the city should borrow federal funds it would be 
necessary to repay them at a later date."32
On 28 June 1955 the Review Journal reported that 
Senator Bible appeared before the Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittee seeking $25,000 to conduct a detailed 
survey of Las Vegas to determine the exact flood control 
measures which would be needed to prevent future flash 
flood damage.33 Every available federal agency had been 
mustered to aid Las Vegas in its search for flood 
relief. In his testimony before the Senate 
Appropriations Committee considering Public Works 
appropriations for the Corps of Engineers, Bible argued 
that this "This growing city cannot wait another year 
before carrying off this needed investigation to map 
definite work specifications to meet the situation."34 
Responding to the local demand for assistance, the
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Bureau of Land Management announced that it might 
construct several small detention dams in Red Rock 
Canyon, west of Las Vegas, the primary source of runoff 
in the recent flood.35
Finally, in 1955, the Corps of Engineers began its 
study, handicapped by the lack of detailed records of 
flood damage prior to 1954. This information had not 
been kept owing to the infrequency of major floods that 
usually occurred many years apart. A sparse population, 
cheap land, and non-existent or minimal building codes 
in the city and county building departments had offered 
inexpensive alternatives to the costly construction of 
flood control works. Now the absence of historical 
storm data became a nightmare for the Army as it 
struggled with the planning and design of a sound 
infrastructure.
In its preliminary investigation, the Corps found 
that as a result of urban development and the 
construction of a substantial infrastructure in suburban 
sections west of the Union Pacific Railroad, the area 
had become subject to damage from a flood of standard 
project magnitude.3 6 (The Corps of Engineers defined a 
standard project flood as a "large hypothetical flood 
that would be exceeded only on rare occasions."37) In 
other words, flood works designed to withstand a 
standard project storm would guarantee almost 
one-hundred percent protection from flooding. Home 
building generated by land developers had not taken into
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account these major rain storms. Moreover, thanks to 
little or no government regulation, they had modified or 
altered the natural drainage courses without improving 
the well-defined channels throughout the urbanized parts 
of the Las Vegas Wash drainage system. Therefore, 
nearly all floods originating west of the Union Pacific 
Railroad caused appreciable damage to the city 
especially after 1940.38
Despite the lack of information necessary for a 
thorough evaluation of the problem, the Army Corps not 
only prepared and documented the causes and effects of 
flooding in the valley but offered solutions. On 15 
November 1955, fifty five persons attended a public 
hearing that had been called by the Corps of Engineers 
to discuss its plans. To those who had suffered in 
previous floods, improvements proposed and considered by 
the Corps of Engineers sounded reasonable. Civic 
leaders at the meeting stated their belief that levees 
and channel improvements would have prevented large 
property damages and business losses resulting from 
frequent flooding during past years.39
What is more, the local interests boiled down their 
requests of the Corps to three main points: first, to
prevent inundation of intensively developed residential, 
commercial, and industrial areas in the cities of Las 
Vegas, North Las Vegas, Henderson, and in the community 
between Nellis Air Force Base and Las Vegas Wash.40 In 
view of the savage destructive force of the flood
47
preceding the meeting, local representatives stressed 
residential protection as their primary concern. The 
second area of concentration centered on protection of 
the extensively developed resort area in Las Vegas (the 
Strip). The third and final goal embodied measures to 
prevent disruption of railroad transportation, highway 
communication, and utility service.41
The Army supplemented local input with cost benefit 
ratio studies that indicated that its plan exceeded 
unity. Essentially the cost benefit ratio focuses on 
the notion that if a project produced two-hundred 
dollars in benefits and cost one hundred dollars the 
cost benefit ratio would be 2:1. If the cost benefit 
ratio is less than unity (one) than the project is not 
worth undertaking.42 Therefore, because of the 
favorable cost benefit ratio of the Las Vegas proposal 
all of the governmental entities agreed that the plan 
was financially sound.
In determining the scope of the project, the Corps 
arrived at a three phase framework with a joint funding 
formula between the local community and the Federal 
Government. The first part of the plan, known as the 
Las Vegas unit, would provide protection for most of 
North Las Vegas, Las Vegas, and the developed area south 
of Las Vegas from floods in the Las Vegas Loop, Las 
Vegas Creek, Charleston Boulevard, and Flamingo Wash 
drainage area (see appendix B).43 To arrive at the 
desired level of protection, the Corps proposed to
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construct one diversion levee and a detention basin 
southwest of the cities of North Las Vegas and Las 
Vegas. This levee, ranging in height from four to 
twenty feet above natural ground surface, would extend 
for 31,000 feet generally southward from a point about 
seven miles northwest of the city of Las Vegas and about 
one mile southwest of Highway No. 95 to the Las Vegas 
detention basin (net capacity 12,660 acre-feet) on 
Flamingo wash west of the Union Pacific railroad about 
five miles southwest of Las Vegas.
The outlet channel, which would be constructed 
eastward for about 50,000 feet from the detention basin 
to Las Vegas Wash, required a capacity ranging from 
3,500 cubic feet per second at the upstream end to 
20,000 at the Las Vegas Wash. Construction of the 
outlet channel would involve building one railroad 
bridge and three new highway bridges. The Las Vegas 
unit also called for a second levee about one-half mile 
about 1/2 mile West of the Las Vegas airport (McCarran 
Field). Approximately 6.5 feet high, this levee would 
extend 8,000 feet northward from the Union Pacific 
railroad, Boulder branch line to the outlet channel.44
The second phase, the Henderson Unit, would provide 
protection for Henderson and adjacent industrial plants 
from floods in the washes south and east of Henderson.45 
To complete the plan, the Corps planned to construct the 
Power Line Road unit that would safeguard the developed 
area south of Nellis Air Force Base from floods in
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washes northeast and northwest of the airbase.46 
Together, these two systems planned and designed by the 
Corps of Engineers had covered every flood prone 
urbanized district in the valley (see Appendix B).
At first glance, the Corps plan seemed like a gift 
from heaven that would appeal to every interest in the 
valley. However, that was not to be the case. Five 
prerequisites had to be met by Clark County prior to 
finalization of the plan and commencement of 
construction. On the surface, these items seemed 
reasonable, but after a complete review of the proposal 
the community divided into two opposing camps. Many 
found the plan unacceptable after analyzing the 
conditions that the Corps intended to impose.
The local community's obligations consisted of:
(a) Provide free of cost to the United States all lands, easements, and right-of-way necessary for theconstruction of the project at a cost estimated at $4,545,000 (June 1959).
(b) Pay for relocation of utilities, construct necessary highway bridges, and dip crossing relocations at a cost estimated at $385,000 (June 1959).
(c) Hold and save the United States free fromdamagesdue to the construction and operation of the works.
(d) Maintain and operate the improvements after completion in accordance with regulations prescribed by the secretary of the Army, at an annual cost estimated at $54,000.
(e) Establish and enforce flood channel limits and regulations satisfactory to the Secretary of theArmy, for the preservation of the flood-carrying capacity of the recommended channel improvements.47
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The Army Corps of Engineers accepted responsibility 
for the excavation and construction of the channel and 
appurtenances. This entailed the largest percentage of 
the initial cost of the works. The local community, 
however, found itself faced with the maintenance of the 
project forever, and in a manner satisfactory to the 
Army. Preliminary estimates for the total cost of the 
operation amounted to $18,460,000. A cost breakdown 
indicated that local entities would pay $4,930,000 while 
the Federal government's share amounted to 
$13,530,000.48
In an effort to solve the problem the State of 
Nevada and Clark County moved on two fronts to expedite 
the implementation of a flood control program. The 
first was to send Hugh Shamberger, state director of 
conservation and natural resources, to Washington, D.C., 
to press for authorization for county-wide flood 
control. Meanwhile Mayor Baker, who was also chairman 
of the conservation district, met with concerned 
citizens and stressed the urgency of the situation. 
Moreover, he tried to muster public support for the 
creation of a viable program. In his meetings, Baker 
drove home the argument that the immediate problem of 
right-of-way acquisition had to be faced before property 
values increased. Furthermore, he emphasized the 
difficulties involved with financing the project. Mayor 
Baker went so far as to suggested that it might be 
necessary to call a special session of the Nevada State
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Legislature to create a new special flood control 
district.49
Establishment of a flood control district to 
supplant the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention 
District became a reality and the vehicle selected by 
the county to manage financing, construction, and 
maintenance of the project. Legislation necessary to 
achieve these ends became law in 1960. Entitled "NRS 
543"50 the Nevada law provided a permanent governmental 
body that incorporated all of the tools necessary to 
comply with the Corps of Engineers report. Clark County 
Commissioners acted as the Board of Directors, and all 
other county elected officials became ex-officio members 
of the district. One of the most important chapters in 
the law, 543.720, permitted the District to issue 
general obligation bonds. County Commissioners and 
other local officials decided that the best method for 
financing the local entities's share of the project 
would be to sell general obligation, flood control 
bonds. This meant that an election had to be held, and 
approval of the voters secured prior to the issuance of 
the bonds. Plans for the bond election gained 
acceptance locally, and the date for the election was 
set for 10 April, 1962."51 Officials assumed that the 
general public wanted flood control in the valley, and 
would vote for bonds as a means of financing the 
project. Accordingly, they instructed the County 
Election Department to prepare ballots and conduct the
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election.
Unhappily for those favoring the program, the 
election also presented an opportunity for special 
interests within the valley, to oppose the Corps of 
Engineers plan. Voters wanted and expected protection 
for the community using the least expensive methods 
available. Yet, as in all issues requiring a vote of 
the general public, two sides emerged over the argument. 
Those opposed to a major flood control program in Las 
Vegas took the opportunity to study the Corps of 
Engineers plan, and point out weaknesses to help defeat 
the bond issue at the polls.
One minority group consisted of residents living on 
the alluvial plain, not subjected to flooding. They 
took the position that since they lived in a safe zone 
they should not be taxed to pay for other people's 
mistakes. Furthermore, they grumbled that folks ought 
to have had better sense than to build or buy homes in a 
flood prone section of the valley.
Land developers also viewed the flood control 
project negatively because it encroached on prime land 
in the Charleston Heights area west of Jones Boulevard 
that they considered desirable for development. Many 
speculators had already prepared plans to construct 
subdivisions in the area under appraisal for the levee 
and channel west of the city. Charleston Heights Tract 
40-A represented one of the Final Maps that had been 
approved by the Las Vegas City Planning Commission prior
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to the election. Located in the path of the proposed 
flood control channel, Charleston Heights Tract 40-A had 
been approved by the Las Vegas Planning Commission on 27 
March 1962 and the Las Vegas City Commission on 4 April 
1962. These approvals came just a few days prior to the 
bond election.52
Anticipating the defeat of the bond issue at the 
polls, and fearing further efforts to reactivate the 
issue after the election, developers prepared to move 
expeditiously to block the proposed levee west of the 
city. Additionally, a group of local consulting 
engineers joined in the argument and advanced several 
compelling arguments against the project. They studied 
the plans of the Corps of Engineers, and presented sound 
engineering and economic reasons why the Corps plan 
ought to be defeated.
Then, in March 1962, just two weeks before the 
election, local engineers called a meeting with members 
of the Army Corps of Engineers to advance their notion 
that the $20 million dollar flood control project had 
been overdesigned.53 Army representatives privately 
viewed the assembly as a "cross examination",54 but 
responded to the inquiry. Louis La Porta, chairman of 
the Board of County Commissioners, Oscar Scherer, George 
Von Tobel, Land Surveyor Jack Levitt; Jack Turner, Clyde 
Keegle, Ewalt Anderson and Boyd Yaden all engineers 
except Leavitt,55 attended the confrontation and 
presented arguments that the project had been
54
overdesigned.
The Army responded that the design had been based 
on studies conducted to establish a maximum hypothetical 
storm and the relative damage and loss of life it would 
cause.56 These local engineers failed to consider that 
few or no records of the previous storms from flooding 
in the valley existed. Newspaper accounts of storms and 
flooding contained the only reliable source of 
information for the Corps. The significance of the lack 
of data on rainfall in the Las Vegas area dictated that 
the Corps of Engineers had to use similar storms that 
had occurred in areas like Las Vegas.
On 4 April 1962, the Review Journal, reported that 
most officials predicted an easy victory for the 
project. The writer went on to say that businessmen on 
the Strip, as well as land developers and speculators 
strongly favored the project, and saw no reason for its 
defeat. Moreover, he bolstered his assessment of an 
easy victory at the polls by noting that although there 
had been voices questioning the project, no open strong 
opposition to the bond issue had presented itself until 
the present time. More broadly, the press declared that 
a group of professional engineers questioned the size of 
the project, but had not taken a stand either favoring 
or rejecting it.57
Two days later on 6 April 1962, the headlines in 
the Review Journal, announced in bold black print, 
"Consulting Engineers Here Oppose Flood Control Plan".58
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The consulting engineers gave several reasons for their 
decision. First they predicted that the cost could go 
as high as $40-million dollars, a sum substantially 
higher than that estimated by the Corps of Engineers. 
Nevertheless, they admitted that the project would 
protect the city of Las Vegas from severe flood damage 
that occurred during a general storm over the entire 
water shed.59
Central to the argument presented by local 
engineers, and the one that caused the great disparity 
between the Corp/s estimated costs and local estimates 
resulted from the notion that because the project would 
not protect areas below the proposed levee from damage, 
a storm drain needed to be included in the plans. 
Consulting engineers argued that the urban area could 
not be adequately protected without the construction of 
an underground storm drain network, and that it needed 
to be built in conjunction with the main channel system 
as proposed by the Army Corps of Engineers. As a 
consequence, the urban areas in Las Vegas faced an all 
or nothing choice.
On Sunday 8 April 1962, an editorial in the Review 
Journal, presented both sides of the story. The press 
focused upon the pragmatic notion that flood control 
like all federal activities usually developed into "pork 
barrel" projects, however work on the proposal ought to 
go foreward for the good of the community. They pointed 
out that costs would never be less, and that some
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protection from the ravages of flooding would be better 
than nothing. Commending local consulting engineers on 
their astute observations, the editor nevertheless, 
encouraged voters to pass the bond issue on the 10th of 
April.60
Time had run out, and the accelerated expansion 
of the city in a westerly direction coupled with a 
massive population explosion led the reporter to observe 
that Las Vegas had already jumped beyond the temporary 
dirt barrier that had been erected along its western 
perimeter.61 The stage was set for the biggest bond 
issue to ever appear on the ballot in Clark County until 
that time.
On election day, both sides continued to press 
their arguments to prospective voters. Oscar Scherer, a 
private consulting engineer and opponent of the project 
speculated that La Porta (Chairman of the County 
Commission) would realize his hope for approval of the 
bond issue. His main criticism focused on the idea that 
the Army's flood control system did not include an 
internal drainage system to drain off water that fell 
below the dike area.62 The polls opened on time and the 
voters began to cast their ballots. Only owners of real 
property could vote, and they did not need to be 
registered to cast a ballot.63
The County Commissioners and Mayor Baker suffered a 
surprising defeat. "Voters Toss Out LV Bond Issue. ... 
Less than 5000 vote here",64 proclaimed the headlines
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the day after the election. The vote was 7 to 4 against 
the proposal. Las Vegas had lost its chance to start a 
flood control program with federal assistance and it 
would never be given another chance. Discouraged public 
works officials began to pick up the pieces and salvage 
what they could from the ashes of defeat. Local 
Engineers, either by intent or by accident, had came 
forth in the newspapers at just the right time to state 
their case and had not allowed time for a rational 
rebuttal by other interested parties.
Pressure from a minority pressure group left the 
public in doubt about the validity of the Army Corps of 
Engineers plan and the wisdom of their elected public 
officials. The argument that the proposed project would 
stop flash flooding that threatened the inundation of 
Las Vegas, while not protecting it from rainfall that 
fell directly on the city had merit. Nevertheless, 
funding for an internal drainage system could have 
waited till the later while the metropolitan area 
developed and expanded its tax base. The inability of 
forces favorable to the flood measures to respond to the 
consulting engineers arguments in the short span of time 
between their attacks upon the plan and the election led 
to the defeat of the measure. Clark County and Las 
Vegas in defeat would have to search for new sources of 
financing to build flood control works for its 
residents.
CHAPTER III 
FROM THE ASHES OF DEFEAT 
TO THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
1962— 1976
The defeat of the flood control bond issue on 10 
April 1962 devastated public works officials and local 
entities. County Commissioner White in stunned 
disbelief observed that "The public doesn't realize what 
it has done to itself."1 In an attempt to save the day 
Richard Sauer, Director of Public Works for the City of 
Las Vegas, suggested that an alternative solution to the 
Corps of Engineers' plan would be to seek cooperation 
from state and county agencies to turn Rainbow Avenue 
into a combination dike and highway.2 Rainbow Avenue 
paralleled the main flood control channel proposed by 
the Army Engineers, and Sauer believed that a dirt levee 
could be constructed cheaply.
Sauer expected the proposed dike to provide a 
limited amount of protection for the city from flash 
flooding that came from the Spring mountains west of Las 
Vegas. He argued that the combination highway-dike 
would intercept most of the storm water, although unlike 
the Corps plan, it would not channel it directly into 
the lower Vegas wash. It presented an inexpensive 
alternative for the community. Along with Sauer,
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frustrated public officials debated other alternatives 
for dealing with the problem, while the community 
continued to urbanize, sprawling over into the 
surrounding flood prone areas.
Each of the political entities located within the 
Las Vegas basin zealously guarded its political 
independence, choosing to make its own political and 
economic decisions, often without consulting its 
neighbors. Failure of the bond issue contributed to the 
polarization of local governments by introducing 
conflict over construction methods, means of financing, 
size of proposed projects, and the location of future 
flood control works. Flooding, the only common element 
in the situation facing the communities in Southern 
Nevada, lost its significance in the ensuing economic 
and political conflicts that arose among the entities.
Thunderstorms and raging torrents of flood water 
failed to respect artificial boundaries erected by 
legislative fiat. Storm water continued to flow in its 
original channel, ignoring homes, streets or other 
objects artificially erected in its pathway. Some 
concerned officials believed that one useful vehicle to 
help solve the valley's mounting flood problems lay in 
the utilization of the Flood Control District law. It 
had been enacted by the Nevada State Legislature in 1960 
for the administration of the proposed Army Engineer's 
flood control plan. Established as a regional agency, 
the Clark County Flood Control District contained all of
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the tools necessary to bring consensus to the municipal 
entities.
Unfortunately for these officials the District had 
not become functional prior to the bond election, and 
existed solely as a paper entity. Without funding for 
personnel to plan and engineer projects, or the means to 
construct flood works the district had no value to the 
community. Although city and county engineers continued 
to isolate problems and design structures to ameliorate 
hazards, without financial backing their efforts 
resulted in meaningless stacks of useless blueprints.
The nexus in the flood control equation binding 
communities in the valley together had been the 
proposition that flooding presented a deadly hazard in 
every entity regardless of political boundaries. On the 
other hand, continuing conflict over the allocation of 
state tax dollars to local communities created friction 
and fueled ongoing adversarial political relationships. 
Clark County, Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, and Henderson 
each struggled to retain the power to oversee the 
expenditure of funds within its own borders. Moreover, 
Commissioners looked suspiciously at any institution not 
under their political supervision, especially empowered 
to spend scarce tax revenue in parts of the county other 
than their own. More than anything else, this atavistic 
notion encouraged political gridlock among the various 
communities, and shaped flood control planning during 
the 1960s and 1970s.
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When faced with competing demands for tax revenues 
from an expanding population base for schools, social 
programs, hospitals, police, and fire departments, flood 
control took a back seat. The normally mild climate, 
together with one of the lowest annual rainfall rates in 
the country continued to lull residents into a false 
sense of security. Touted as a tourist mecca and desert 
paradise by the Chamber of Commerce and the news media, 
Las Vegas in the 1960s assumed a reputation of security 
that belied the hazards from flood storms. Realists who 
continued to remind local residents that floods could 
and would strike the valley again often achieved the 
status of iconoclastic pessimists.
Each political subdivision realized that storm 
water had to flow through the Las Vegas and Flamingo 
Washes where they crossed municipal boundaries yet 
officials could not agree upon the size or the location 
of the works to be constructed. Recognizing the need 
for unity of purpose, the various communities decided to 
fund a master drainage plan. In 1963, they jointly 
retain VTN of Nevada, a consulting engineering firm, to 
compile the necessary data and prepare the "Las Vegas 
Master Drainage Plan."3 The plan identified all of the 
major channels passing through the valley. This master 
plan guided the cities and county on the optimum 
location for proposed flood control works and size of 
channels. Local public works departments could, and 
did, alter the size of the recommended channels to fit
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their budgets or political views. Furthermore, each 
entity funded and constructed only those parts of 
channels that flowed through its jurisdiction, when and 
if it deemed it necessary.
Lacking money and pressed by the demands of the 
people for schools and social services, community 
leaders of the various entities left flood control to 
their planning and engineering departments. Both groups 
constantly stressed the importance of preserving the 
integrity of natural washes and attempted to control 
land development in flood prone areas by requesting 
their governing bodies pass planning and zoning 
ordinances. As early as 1975, public works officials 
attempted to place restrictions on land developers, 
builders, and contractors when they believed it to be in 
the public interest and in accordance with local and 
state statutes.
These restrictions, presented as staff 
recommendations to the City and County Commissioners, 
detailed the flood control situation prior to final 
approval of the plans for construction. The outcome of 
this loose inter-governmental situation resulted in the 
construction of inadequate, piecemeal flood control 
works. On 5 July 1975, the Review Journal accurately 
described the situation by reporting that land 
developers and construction crews often filled up washes 
to accommodate subdivisions while diverting the flow of 
storm water onto other property that had not been
63
subjected to flooding. The picture of upstream concrete 
flood works emptying into a subdivision that had been
built in a flood plain as the result of greedy land
speculation or poor planning made news.
The Review Journal bitterly denounced the ongoing 
land development process as "backward construction1̂ , 
and focused attention on the poorly funded system that 
encouraged the construction of channels whose segments 
often did not connect with each other or had differing 
depths and widths. Attempting to concentrate public 
attention on the need for flood control, the newspapers 
often spoke out for reform. The defeat of the bond
issue at the polls, however, rendered their efforts a
lost cause.
The day-to-day attempts of public works officials 
to cope with an expanding population, while hampered by 
under staffed and underfunded departments, precluded the 
planning or development of an adequate infrastructure. 
Inexpensive land in marginal areas yielded a larger 
profit than similar land located in sites that were free 
from flooding. Despite the efforts of well intentioned 
governmental officials, land developers continued to 
seek methods to avoid paying for costly flood control 
measures necessary to protect their developments.
As a last resort, local entities began requiring 
engineers to calculate the volume of storm water that 
paved streets would carry during a rain storm of a 
defined magnitude. Using streets and alleys to carry
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surface runoff in lieu of costly channels, culverts, and 
storm drains during floods became standard practice for 
land developers. The theory had been tried, tested, and 
adopted in the pioneer days of the settlement of Las 
Vegas, and once again became the method chosen to 
dispose of surface drainage. Acceptance of this archaic 
system by the general public, with its flooded streets, 
water damaged homes, and disrupted communications 
systems indicated their acquiescence in the atavistic 
ideology that had dominated the city since its inception 
as a railroad division point.
The notion of raising taxes to fund a 
comprehensive system of flood control found little 
support with the public. Despite the parsimonious mood 
of the taxpayers and the State Legislature, County 
Public Works Director, George Monahan intended to 
upgrade the program with the appointment of James 
Scholl, as Deputy Director of Public Works for Flood 
Control and Off-Sites in 1971. Scholl's budget for the 
1972-1973 fiscal year was a meager $35,441.5 These 
funds, had been earmarked for flood control in the 
county's urban Las Vegas area as well as the towns of 
Mesquite, Bunkerville, Overton, and Logandale.
The limited funds barely covered the Deputy 
Director's salary and cost of cataloging existing flood 
structures and hazards within the county. But in 1974, 
after identifying the worst problems, the County 
Commission allocated $700,000 to flood control for the
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express purpose of launching an interim program. 
Moreover, in January of 1974 the commissioners approved 
the county flood control division to sign a $44,500 
contract with Baughman, Haught and Turner Inc., 
Consulting Engineers, to start work on the top 
priority— design of a flood control channel on Monson 
Road between Nellis Boulevard and the Las Vegas Wash.6
Although many more small projects followed, they 
were reactions to events rather than results of advanced 
planning. The other communities of the valley had also 
begun to establish flood works along the major washes 
within their boundaries. Generally, engineers followed 
the VTN master plan for the location of their projects; 
however, the size of the works often prompted 
disagreement between the entities. Yet, each city 
independently funded the total cost of the project 
through their respective areas. On the national level, 
flood control had captured the interest of the federal 
government, mainly because of severe flooding in the 
eastern part of the United States especially in the 
Mississippi Valley.
In the mid-1960s, the federal government began to 
address the need for non-structural approaches to flood 
loss reduction through land use planning, building, 
construction standards, and an insurance program.
Federal agencies concerned with flooding recognized that 
some sections of the country suffered flood damage year 
after year and that financial losses to the public at
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large were becoming intolerable.
The United States Congress finally responded to the 
crisis by passing the National Flood Insurance Act in 
1968 and the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973. The 
heart of this legislation was the identification and 
mapping of flood prone areas within the United States. 
Federal insurance rates in turn focused upon the 
elevation of existing and proposed construction above 
the identified flood plain shown on the government's 
maps as the basis for insurance premiums. The property 
owner paid a premium amount based upon the probability, 
predictability, and frequency of flooding of his 
property within the identified flood hazard. Many local 
communities throughout the United States did not want to 
participate in the program. Federal authorities, 
however, made it impossible for them to avoid entering 
the plan.
Clark County was scheduled to enter the program on 
1 July 1975. The lever used to guarantee both entry and 
compliance with the program came from Washington's 
threat to withhold federal funds from the county. To 
show its determination the Federal Insurance 
Administration issued an edict stating that if Clark 
County failed to enter the program within the prescribed 
time, it would institute a moratorium on all loans for 
new construction and mortgages from lending institutions 
insured under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC)
On 7 October 1974, at the regular meeting of the
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County Commission, Deputy Director of Flood Control, 
James Scholl appeared before the Board to seek 
authorization for the county to institute the necessary 
paper work to make flood insurance available to the 
people of Clark County under the National Flood 
Insurance Program of 1973. Scholl told the Board that 
enrollment had to be accomplished prior to 1 July 1975 
to ensure the continuation of federal funds for Clark 
County.7 The motion to proceed with the application 
passed the Board of Commissioners unanimously.
Entry into the insurance program required the 
passage by the County Commission of two resolutions, 
Resolution "A" and Resolution "B". Resolution "A" 
recognized that certain sections of Clark County had 
been subjected to periodic flooding from streams and 
washes causing serious damage to properties at those 
locations. Furthermore, the county resolved to enact 
and maintain in force for those areas having flood 
hazards adequate land use and control measures together 
with enforcement provisions consistent with the criteria 
set forth in section 1910 of the National Flood 
Insurance Program Regulation. Moreover, Clark County 
vested the Flood Control Division, of its Department of 
Public Works with the responsibility, authority, and 
means to maintain for public inspection, and to furnish 
upon request, a record of elevations (in relation to sea 
level) of the lowest floor (including basement) of all 
new or substantially improved structures located in the
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special flood hazard areas. If the lowest floor 
elevation was below grade on one or more sides, the 
elevation of the floor immediately above also needed to 
be recorded.8
At the same meeting, County Commissioners passed 
Resolution "B" that verified the fact that the county 
had adopted the "Uniform Building Code, 1973 Edition, 
(International Conference of Building Officials).9 This 
resolution strengthened the enforcement of flood control 
procedures and minimized future abuses by local 
developers and contractors, who often failed to take 
into account the problem of flooding. The Commission 
directed Scholl to review all plans submitted for 
building permits to ascertain that all public 
facilities, such as sewer, gas, electrical, and water 
systems are located, elevated, and constructed to 
minimize or eliminate flood damage.10
Using the newly approved resolutions, Scholl made 
application for Clark County to the Federal Insurance 
Administrator for flood insurance under the Flood 
Disaster Protection Act of 1973. On 3 0 May 1975, the 
Acting Federal Insurance Administrator, J. Robert 
Hunter, once again clarified the government's intention 
to freeze local financing for building construction.il 
Barely a month later on 4 July 1975, the Review 
Journal announced that, just in time for torrential 
rains and flooding streets, Clark County had been 
accepted into the National Flood Insurance Program.12
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Hunter, acting Federal Insurance Administrator predicted 
that the new program would offer "the best way of 
protecting property owners from the ravages of floods, 
while easing the burden on the general public."13
That day, 4 July 1975, the worst storm since the 
1950s struck Las Vegas sending damage estimates into the 
millions of dollars. Two men died in the storm, which 
was believed to be the most destructive flood to hit Las 
Vegas in twenty years. The men, both North Las Vegas 
street workers, perished under a wall of flood water 
that swept their vehicle off the road. Scholl reported 
to the news media that most of the damage in the valley 
related to homes and autos and that preliminary damage 
estimates exceeded two million dollars. Larry Hampton, 
Las Vegas Director of Public Works, reported that the 
City's sewage system had been put out of service, and 
fixed the city's cost of repairs at more than $100,000. 
At the federal level, Robert Stevens had been dispatched 
to the area to assist with damage assesment.14
Pointing to a factor unique in the Las Vegas flood 
control equation, Bob Whitney, Public Works Director of 
Henderson, observed in an interview with reporters from 
the Review Journal that flood control is something that 
no one needs until it rains; He further observed that 
many residents, as well as some government officials, 
when advised about flood danger, gaze at the cloudless 
sky in disbelief and say: "Flood? Here?"15 The 
significance of the rhetorical question and answer
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highlight the misconception that desert areas are immune 
to flood hazards.
In the wake of the flood of 1975 Army Corps of 
Engineers economist Dan Young and Hydraulic Engineer Tim 
Yeh began collecting data in Las Vegas for future 
possible designs of flood works. Swamped with requests 
for assistance from local residents, the Corps's 
representatives responded that they came to Las Vegas to 
collect information, "not begin any construction or take 
complaints from the residents."16 They suggested that 
any information helpful to the Corps could be mailed to 
James Scholl at Clark County's Flood Control 
Department.17
Seventy years of drainage problems and flooding 
caused by the construction of impervious surfaces such 
as paved streets, parking lots, and roof tops in 
conjunction with Las Vegas's population explosion 
resulted in a legal challenge to the County's adaptation 
and use of the civil law doctrine as the principle for 
adjudicating damages between property owners. In 1976, 
a number of local residents jointly filed an action 
against Clark County for damages sustained to their 
properties. The lower court agreed with the plaintiff, 
and entered a judgment for just compensation and damages 
against Clark County.
Clark County's District Attorney, Robert Miller, 
appealed to the Nevada State Supreme Court for relief.18 
Speaking for the Court, Justice Mowbray held that the
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lower court correctly adopted the "reasonable use" rule 
for determining competing rights between landowners and 
the County. Furthermore, the high court held that the 
land-owner's situation had been caused by the County's 
unreasonable acts, making it "liable for such 
injuries."19 Judge Mowbray's decision overturned the 
foundation upon which drainage disputes had been settled 
in Las Vegas and other parts of the southwestern United 
States for decades.
There are three basic legal doctrines that dictate 
the adjudication of flood water in the United States, 
the "common enemy doctrine", the "civil law rule", and 
the "rule of reasonable use". The common enemy doctrine 
stipulates that property owners have the right to do as 
they please with their land. Moreover, they can fend 
off hostile storm waters and refuse to allow them to 
enter or cross their property. Furthermore, they need 
not take into account the consequences of damage to 
other surrounding land owners. It is apparent, even to 
the casual observer, that this principle is of no 
practical value in addressing flood problems in urban 
areas.20
Diametrically opposed to the common enemy doctrine 
is the civil law concept. As noted earlier, the civil 
law rule states that the lower land owner must accept 
any surface water that drains onto his property but the 
upper owner has no right to increase the quantity of 
water over the amount that would have occurred
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naturally. Civil law rule traces its roots back to 
Roman law, and more recently to the Code Napoleon.
Clark County had used the civil law rule as its guiding 
legal principle since the founding of the community, and 
the State of California has followed the rule for over 
one-hundred years.21
The strength of the civil law rule places the 
burden of flooding upon those who purchase the land, 
requiring that they accept it subject to the natural 
drainage conditions.22 This concept fit the 
individualism of the founding fathers of the city, as 
well as the pioneering spirit of the early 
European-American settlers in the region. Furthermore, 
use of the legal plan added support to the community's 
parsimonious philosophy toward the expenditure of tax 
money for flood control works.
Judge Mowbray's decision in favor of the reasonable 
use rule constituted a substantial departure from 
contemporary legal ideology in the 1970s. Its 
acceptance over the common enemy rule and civil law 
concept forced the community and public works officials 
to consider new options when dealing with land 
development and flood control issues.23 Essentially, the 
opinion focused on factors other than the location of 
the litigants' land with respect to their downstream 
neighbors' boundary line. After Mowbray's decision, 
each and every case had to be judged upon all of the 
urban development that had taken place on land in a
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watershed contributing surface water onto a property 
situated further downstream.
Public works officials argued that because all 
urban development increased the ratio of rainfall to 
runoff, every new construction project in the County 
increased the probability for future flooding and 
litigation. Moreover, by continuing to issue building 
permits without the construction of an underground storm 
drain system or other positive drainage facility, local 
governments, as approving agencies assumed the liability 
for property damage resulting from flooding. In 
essence, they perceived that municipal construction and 
land development might be slowed or halted because of 
the change in legal philosophy.
The legal action taken by Powers, Lowe, et al, 
against Clark County clearly illustrated and defined the 
situation.24 In the 1950s and 1960s, Powers, Lowe, et 
al. purchased property on the banks of a dry wash 
outside of the urban center of the community near Topaz 
Street and Desert Inn Road. Rain storms had eroded a 
natural channel through their land on its way to the 
Flamingo Wash. At the time of their purchase, flooding 
rarely occurred because of the gentle slope, small 
amount of storm water, porous soil conditions, and lack 
of nuisance water.25 These conditions prevailed until 
the mid 1970s, when pressure from an expanding 
population increased the density of new home 
construction, apartment dwellings, and shopping centers
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upstream from the litigants property.
New development with its asphalt streets, concrete 
sidewalks, and impervious roof tops brought an increased 
volume of nuisance water as well as an accelerated flow 
of storm water through the litigant/s property. The 
intermittent stream had been transformed into a 
continuous free-flowing creek complete with reeds, 
mosquitos, and other aquatic life. Under the civil law 
doctrine, Powers and his neighbors would have had no 
recourse other than to accept the surface water onto 
their property and discharge onto their neighbor's land. 
Each one knowingly built his home in a marginal flood 
hazard and had no redress other than to accept the water 
onto their property, and to discharge it on the land of 
their neighbor downstream.
During the eleven-day trial, the litigants based 
their case on the theories of reasonable use and argued 
the legal points of inverse condemnation, nuisance, and 
trespass. Furthermore, the litigants demanded that 
Clark County pay them for their injuries and purchase 
the Powers property in its entirety, because it had no 
further value other than as a flood channel.26 Judge 
Mowbray agreed with the inverse condemnation charge of 
illegally taking a property without just compensation. 
Attorneys for Powers, et al. further argued that one 
landowner could not enrich himself at the expense of 
another. The County rebutted the plaintiff's arguments 
by citing the notion that it was "not liable for
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injuries caused by what it terms 'urbanization' or rapid 
economic growth."27 The court responded to the County's 
argument with the statement, "We cannot agree."28
Clark County's loss of the Powers, Lowe case 
demonstrated the need for long-term planning, 
construction, and maintenance of a flood control 
infrastructure in the Las Vegas Valley. More broadly, 
it synthesized the community's perceptions of the 
effects of urbanization on the drainage eco-system in 
the valley, and led to a complete re-evaluation of the 
flood control program. Additionally, future land 
developers, landowners, and officials had to consider 
the full consequences of their plans upon the community 
before approving them for final implementation.29 
More importantly, it forced a fundamental ideological 
change from a frontier mentality of individualism to the 
concept of collective community action.
The development of flood control in the Las Vegas 
Valley followed the lines of least resistance. Most of 
the year the residents accepted the dry fair weather 
bestowed upon them by nature. Living in a small town, 
surrounded by vast areas of cheap land, and with one of 
the lowest annual rainfall rates in the country the 
people failed to perceive the dangers of flooding.
Events greater than the dreams of the early European 
American settlers overtook the railroad community, and 
forced it and its people to change their personal 
outlook from that of free pioneering spirits living on
the last frontier in the United States to members of 
large cosmopolitan city.
EPILOGUE
Eighty five years after the founding of Las Vegas, 
residents continue to speculate about the hazards of 
flooding. On 11 August 1991, the Review Journal 
reported that rain and lightning hit the valley starting 
fires and closing streets to vehicular traffic.1 The 
storm caused Marian Timmerman to recall the death of her 
friend Misty Alexander who drowned in a flood channel at 
Topaz and Russell roads during the flood in June 1990. 
Her death and the property damages estimated to have 
been about 8.7 million dollars resulting from the summer 
floods of 1990 illustrated the community's legacy of 
failure through ignorance and neglect of the flood 
control problem. Flood control officials concede that 
they are trying to remedy years of mistakes, and 
inattention to the problem but that playing "catch up" 
is difficult.2
The errors, inattention, and mistakes that 
prevented an effective response to the dangers of 
flooding can be attributed to politics, greed, and 
economics. Counter-factually, if the voters had passed 
the bond election in the early 1960s, and accepted the 
Army Corps of Engineers plan, the hazards from flooding 
could have been lessened. Those who argued for the 
defeat of the bond issue failed to grasp the 
significance between no flood control system or a
7 7
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partial system that could be expanded at a later date. 
Despite the continuing arguments and finger pointing 
about the failure to remedy the dangers from flooding, 
they still exist. George Monahan put the situation in 
context when he said: "It wasn't ignorance, it wasn't 
pressure, it wasn't anything else, except the money just 
wasn't available for flood control measures."3
The decision by County leaders to design streets to 
carry flood water rather than constructing storm drains 
resulted from a parsimonious economic approach.
Political expediency dictated that social programs take 
precedence over flood control in the bureaucratic 
struggle for public funds. Lack of significant annual 
rainfall in the Las Vegas Valley permitted local leaders 
to justify the denial of funds for an expensive storm 
drain.4
On 11 August 1991, Urban Livengood, a Clark County 
Deputy Director of Public Works noted that the drainage 
practice in Clark County's early development dictated 
leaving flood control decisions to private developers.5 
Public Works Director, George Monahan concurred with 
Livengood's perception that land developers exerted a 
strong influence on matters pertaining to flood control. 
According to Monahan, developers often sought permission 
to divert storm water on to property other than their 
own, and "this was fine. As long as we didn't authorize 
it, nobody could blame us. We wouldn't have the 
liability."6 It is here, in both Livengood's and
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Monahan's perceptions, that we can see the effects of 
the early settlers philosophical notions of 
individualism, and the reason for the court's decision 
to overturn the Civil Law Doctrine. Furthermore, the 
biased attitude of the political leaders of the 
community in favor of land developers and speculators 
often acted to deter dedicated employees from acting in 
the best interests of the public.
The case of Wishing Well Ranches #5 illustrates the 
friction that often occurred because public works 
officials attempted to protect the residents from the 
hazards of flooding. On 29 September 1976, Don Ware, a 
homeowner who lived at 8041 South Wishing Well Road 
wrote the County Flood Control Division complaining that 
new construction by a land developer and contractor had 
occurred behind his home, increasing the probability of 
flooding to his property.7 James Scholl, Deputy Director 
of Public Works, responded to the letter by conducting a 
field investigation of the area. Scholl agreed with Mr. 
Ware that a problem existed and that the developer's 
engineer would be notified of the problem and directed 
to take remedial action to ameliorate the situation. 
After being notified of the homeowner's fears, the 
engineer employed by the developer responded in writing 
to Scholl.
On 26 October 1977, the engineer submitted a 
written report that asserted that the new construction 
enhanced the situation rather than increased the danger
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to the property owner. Furthermore, the engineer argued 
that the area would not flood and presented his approved 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) plans to 
substantiate his position.8 Scholl disagreed with the 
engineer's assessment, however, but when faced with the 
written report and the FHA approved plans, he allowed 
construction to proceed. On 16 August 1977, a rainstorm 
flooded Wishing Well Ranch Subdivision.
A meeting took place in Wishing Well Ranch on 18 
August 1977 among the engineer, land developer, 
contractor, and residents. Scholl stood by his original 
claim that the
new construction had increased the possibility of 
flooding in the area. The developer countered that both 
FHA and Clark County had approved the plans and 
therefore he should not be held responsible for the 
damages. Scholl took the position that the County's 
policy toward developers ought to be more rigorously 
enforced and promised in the future to review their 
plans more closely in an effort to better protect the 
public.
Enraged by Scholl's statement, the developer on 18 
August 1977 wrote to Thalia Dondero, Chairman of the 
Clark County Commission, asserting that Scholl had set 
himself up as "judge, jury, and executioner."9 
Moreover, the developer wondered whether such a threat 
by a county employee constituted a case for the district 
attorney, the courts, or if it was simply an
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administrative problem.10 In any event, Scholl ended 
the inquiry by responding in writing to Chairman Dondero 
stating the facts surrounding the issue.11 Cought 
between the political forces that controlled local 
government and a private sector motivated by profit 
often left well intentioned public employees such as 
Scholl in an untenable situation.
The difficulty in enforcing community standards by 
government officials is clearly illustrated in the 
foregoing situation. It also illustrated the pressing 
need for reform of the legal system that had manifested 
itself in the Powers, Lowe v Clark County court case 
that overturned the archaic Civil Law Doctrine and the 
frontier philosophy.
The courts in their wisdom set new legal standards 
requiring the approving governmental agency to accept 
financial responsibility for the approval of plans and 
building permits. Forced by law, local governmental 
agencies had to enforce rigid flood control measures in 
flood prone areas. However, the struggle over flood 
control continued on another front. On 11 November 
1992, the Review Journal reported that land developers 
continued to seek a re-definition of flood area maps in 
Clark County. These maps provide the basis for flood 
insurance rates in Clark County.
Under pressure from land developers the Federal 
government with a stroke of the pen can make the flood 
hazard zones disappear from the maps, but will the
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danger go away? John Hall, a reporter for the Review 
Journal observed that "in Southern Nevada, where it is 
difficult to distinguish the developers from some city 
councilmen and county commissioners, these questions are 
bound to have more than one answer."12 Therein lies the 
core truth for many of the flood control failures as 
well as the future of flood control in the Las Vegas 
Valley.
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